Chilling  the Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting by Hazlett, Thomas W. & Sosa, David W.
Michigan Technology Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 1
1998
"Chilling" the Internet? Lessons from FCC
Regulation of Radio Broadcasting
Thomas W. Hazlett
University of California, Davis
David W. Sosa
University of California, Davis
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Communications Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Internet Law
Commons, and the Legislation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting , 4 Mich. Telecomm.
& Tech. L. Rev. 35 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol4/iss1/2
"CHILLING" THE INTERNET?
LESSONS FROM FCC REGULATION OF
RADIO BROADCASTING
Thomas W. Hazlett and David W. Sosa*
Cite As: Thomas W. Hazlett and David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the
Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting,
4 MICH. TELECOmm. TECH. L. REv. 35 (1998) available at
<http:/www.mttlr.org/volfour/hazlett.pdf>.
ExEcuTIvE SUMMARY ...................................................................... 35
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 36
II. CONTENT REGULATION IN BROADCASTING ............................... 41
Im. CONTENT REGULATION PRE-"FAIRNEsS" ........................ 44
IV. RED LION: THE REST OF THE STORY ........................................ 45
V. NIXON'S "CHILL" .................................................................... 47
VI. EXTENDING THE "CHILL" BEYOND WASHINGTON POLITICS ......... 50
VII. THE FCC LIFTS RADIO REGULATION, 1979-87 ........................ 51
VIII. DID THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE "WARM" OR "CHILI'? ............. 54
A. Programming Trends in Radio: 1975-1995 ..................... 55
B. The FCC's Economic Model ............................................. 61
IX. CONTENT CONTROLS AND THE INTERNET ................................. 63
X . CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 66
ExECuTwE SUMMARY
Congress included the Communications Decency Act (CDA) in
the Telecommunications Act signed into law on February 8, 1996. The
bill seeks to outlaw the use of computers and phone lines to transmit
"indecent" material with provisions of jail terms and heavy fines for
violators. Proponents of the bill argue it is necessary to protect minors
from undesirable speech on the Internet. The CDA was immediately
challenged in court by the American Civil Liberties Union, and the
special 3-judge federal panel established to hear the case recently de-
clared the Act unconstitutional. Yet, its ultimate adjudication remains
in doubt. Ominously, the federal government has long experimented
* The authors are respectively: Professor of Agricultural & Resource Economics, and
Director, Program on Telecommunications Policy, University of California, Davis; and
Doctoral Student, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of Califor-
nia, Davis.
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with regulations designed to improve the content of "electronic"
speech. The Fairness Doctrine, for example, imposed on radio and
television stations until 1987, was an attempt to establish a standard of
"fair" coverage for important public issues. The deregulation of con-
tent controls for AM and FM radio programming, first under the
Carter FCC in early 1981, and then under the Reagan FCC (which
abolished the Fairness Doctrine in 1987), led to profound changes in
radio markets. Specifically, the volume of informational programming
increased dramatically immediately after controls were ended-
powerful evidence of the potential for regulation to impose a "chilling
effect" on free speech.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fearing that the anarchic nature of the Internet might unleash an
"electronic red-light district," Senators Jim Exon (D-NE) and Slade
Gorton (R-WA) introduced the Communications Decency Act (CDA)'
in February 1995. The CDA allows for fines of up to $250,000 and
two years imprisonment for someone who, "by means of a telecom-
munications device knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and initiates
the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, im-
age, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing
that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, re-
gardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication. 2 Spurred on by conservative groups
such as the Christian Coalition, and reflecting a desire on the part of
lawmakers to avoid being labeled "pro-smut," the bill passed the Sen-
ate as an amendment to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, by a
vote of 84-16.2 In a congressional conference committee the language
of the CDA survived several challenges and became law when Presi-
dent Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act on February 8,
1996.4
Several significant criticisms against the legislation have been
raised. First, there are serious questions about the constitutionality of
the CDA. The bill proposes to outlaw the transmission of "indecent"
speech over the Internet, in spite of the fact that indecency is a cate-
gory of speech which the Supreme Court has previously ruled
1. 141 CONG. Rac. S1944, 1953 (1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
2. S. 652, 104th Cong., § 402(e)(1) (1995).
3. 141 CONG. RFc. S8460, 8462 (1995).
4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in various sections of 47 U.S.C.)
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deserving of protection under the First Amendment. Indecency di-
verges from obscenity, which is not afforded First Amendment
protection, in that while both appeal to the prurient, indecent speech,
when considered in its entirety, possesses some "serious artistic, liter-
ary, political or scientific value."5 Interestingly enough, the
Department of Justice (DoJ), which is now in the position of defend-
ing the CDA in a court challenge, previously held the position that the
CDA might "threaten important First Amendment and privacy
rights."6
Indeed, the CDA had to overcome serious congressional resistance
on the way to becoming law. Recognizing the difficulties in criminal-
izing a form of speech generally afforded First Amendment
protection, many in the House were initially not amenable to spon-
soring a bill bordering on censorship. House Speaker Newt Gingrich
(R-GA) declared the Exon amendment "clearly a violation of free
speech and a violation of the right of adults to communicate with each
other."7 In an effort to sidestep constitutional concerns, Representa-
tives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-OR) drafted a more
moderate proposal,8 and on August 4, 1995 the House voted 421-4 to
attach the Cox-Wyden amendment to the House Telecommunications
Reform Bill. An attempt was made in conference committee to recon-
cile the House and Senate versions by replacing the indecency
standard with a "harmful to minors" standard, but a last minute pro-
posal by Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) returned the
indecency standard, passing by a one vote margin.
Anticipating legal challenges to the CDA, Congress provided for
an abbreviated review of the rule in the Telecommunications Act. The
first lawsuit was to be heard by a special three-judge panel in Phila-
delphia and any subsequent appeal would go directly to the Supreme
Court.9 Indeed, a broad coalition of civil libertarian groups and high-
tech firms, for which the ACLU was the lead plaintiff, filed a lawsuit
seeking to overturn the CDA the day President Clinton signed the bill.
On February 15, 1996 Judge Ronald Buckwalter granted the ACLU's
request for a temporary restraining order against the CDA,'0 and on
5. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,34(1973).
6. Letter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Patrick
Leahy, Democrat-Vermont (May 3, 1995) (on file with author).
7. Steven Levy, No Place for Kids; a Parent's guide to Sex on the Net, NEWSWEEK,
July 3, 1995, at 47.
8. The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
9. Telecommunications Act § 561.
10. ACLU v. Reno, 24 Media L. Rep. 1379 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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June 11 the three-judge panel issued its ruling, striking down the CDA
on constitutional grounds." The DoJ subsequently announced it would
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Some see the CDA as unnecessary legislation. The DoJ has argued
that existing obscenity laws are sufficient to target pornographic mate-
rial on the Internet. In fact, the DoJ noted that "the Department's
Criminal Division has, indeed, successfully prosecuted violations of
federal child pornography and obscenity laws which were perpetrated
with computer technology."'
2
A third problem with the legislation is that, while the Internet is
not devoid of graphic discourse and erotic imagery, it may not be the
smut hub that political alarmists allege. In 1995 Time magazine was
forced to retreat from an incendiary cover story that drastically over-
stated the availability of pornography on the Internet. 3 Moreover,
software programs which allow parents to exclude access to off-color
material is available from a number of vendors. Subsequent reports
suggest that X-rated material is not prolific on the Internet, and, when
available, is rarely available to browsing innocents without first ex-
tracting a fee to partake in more intimate images and language. In
fact, the Senate had a choice between the CDA and a proposal by Pat
Leahy (D-VT) to commission a study of Internet speech. 5 The Leahy
bill, which did not pass in the Senate, would have ordered the De-
partment of Justice to evaluate whether pornography on the Internet
was a problem that needed fixing. 6
But beyond these oft-cited criticisms lies a more compelling argu-
ment against interfering with Internet speech, whether in the form of the
CDA or some yet-to-be-crafted mandate that attempts to curb undesir-
able Internet communication. The CDA is the most recent incarnation
of a regulatory tool typically applied to broadcasters: content regula-
tion. Content regulations attempt to control the flow of information by
11. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
12. See Letter from Markus to Leahy, supra note 6.
13. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near You: It's Popular, Pervasive and Surpris-
ingly Perverse, According to the First Survey of Online Erotica, TraE, July 3, 1995, at 38.
(The authors point out that the article was based on a discredited study by a Carnegie Mellon
undergraduate).
14. The majority of sources of pornography on computer networks are bulletin board
services which only allow access to paying customers. This places a generally insurmount-
able barrier between offensive material and the average child.
15. S. 714, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
16. See Letter from Markus to Leahy, supra note 6. Indeed, the DoJ recommended "that
a comprehensive review be undertaken of current laws and law enforcement resources for
prosecuting online obscenity and child pornography, and the technical means available to
enable parents and users to control the commercial and non-commercial communications
they receive over interactive telecommunications systems."
[Vol. 4:35
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imposing sanctions on content providers (licensees in broadcasting;
networks and individuals on the Internet) should certain communica-
tions be deemed inappropriate. Previous content rules, as applied to
broadcasters, range from "non-entertainment guidelines," to the Fair-
ness Doctrine, to the "equal time" rule regarding coverage of political
candidates.
Because content regulation carries the danger of a "chilling effect"
on speech, it has always walked a fine constitutional line. Relying on
a dubious analysis of "physical scarcity"'7 and a fanciful history of the
"chaos" in the 1920s radio market, 8 the Supreme Court has deter-
mined that the electronic press enjoys less protection from
government regulation than does the print press. 9 The Court has also
held, however, that its views of the matter would change markedly if
evidence of a "chilling effect" from regulation were to surface.
In a landmark 1969 case, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the
Supreme Court ruled that provisions in the Fairness Doctrine obliging
broadcasters to provide free air time to individuals who wished to re-
spond to a personal attack does not violate the First Amendment. The
Court's 8-0 decision assumed that the doctrine was effective in in-
creasing the coverage of controversial issues by broadcasters, but it
also noted the potential for a "chilling effect."
It is strenuously argued ... that if political editorials or personal
attacks will trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the op-
portunity for expression to speakers who need not pay for time
and whose views are unpalatable to the licensees, then broadcast-
ers will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their coverage
of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least ren-
dered wholly ineffective. Such a result would indeed be a serious
matter, for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of
controversial issues, the purposes of the doctrine would be sti-
fled.... And if experience with the administration of these
doctrines indicates that they have the net effect of reducing
rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage,
17. See generally Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. &
EcON. 1 (1959).
18. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broad-
cast Spectrum, 33 J. L. & ECON. 133 (1990).
19. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Turner Broad-
casting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994). See David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of
the Telecommunications Press, 1975 Duke L.J. 213 (1975) (compelling critiques of the state
of the law); LUCAS PowE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987);
and Robert Corn-Revere, 32 POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (June 28, 1995).
1997-19981
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there will be time enough to reconsider the constitutional im-
plications.'
Several factors contribute to the possible "chill" of content regu-
lation. Principal among them are standards that tend to be vague and
overly broad such as what constitutes "fairness" or "indecency." In
addition, severe economic penalties such as possible loss of license
for broadcasters who violate FCC rules, and the CDA, which allows
for fines up to $250,000, and two years in prison. With such dual pen-
alties looming, content providers will tend to self censor in order to
avoid even approaching the fuzzy line between acceptable and unac-
ceptable, or even criminal, speech. Thus it is possible that legitimate
(i.e., constitutionally protected) speech will not be broadcast to avoid
risk of regulatory or legal sanction, and the associated litigation costs,
thereby producing the "chilling effect" on speech about which the
Court was concerned. In issuing a temporary restraining order against
the CDA, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter, voiced his concern about the
vague nature of the indecency standard:
Where I do feel that the plaintiffs [ACLU et al.] have raised
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful questions is in their
argument that the CDA is unconstitutionally vague ... This
strikes me as being serious because the undefined word
"indecent," standing alone, would leave reasonable people
perplexed in evaluating what is or is not prohibited by the
statute. It is a substantial question because this word alone is
the basis for a criminal felony prosecution."
Since 1969, at least three compelling events have produced evi-
dence that FCC content rules had a "chilling effect" on controversial
speech in radio and television, evidence the Court did not find in Red
Lion. First, the appearance of Fred Friendly's 1975 book, The Good
Guys, The Bad Guys and the First Amendment, illustrated that the ap-
plication of FCC regulation was an effort to suppress free speech by
filing Fairness Doctrine challenges (although this was unknown to the
Supreme Court in Red Lion). Second, the FCC issued a study in 1985
which indicated, under the "public interest" standard of the 1934
Communications Act, that the Fairness Doctrine had served as a disin-
centive to broadcasters wishing to air controversial news and public
opinion programming. Finally, following FCC repeal of the Fairness
Doctrine in 1987, we can observe the effect of deregulation on radio
20. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393.
21. Reno, 24 Media L. Rep at 1379.
[Vol. 4:35
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markets-a stunning increase in the provision of informational pro-
gramming. As shown below, this explosion in news, talk and public
affairs formats in both AM and FM is powerful evidence that the
FCC's previous efforts to regulate broadcast content did indeed result
in a "chilling effect." Thus, by the Supreme Court's own legal analy-
sis, content controls on electronic speech should be unconstitutional.'
A recent case suggests that the indecency standard of the CDA
might well extend its "chill" to the very heart of social discourse.
Consider the case of breast cancer discussion groups carried by
America Online (AOL), the largest Internet service provider (ISP). In
December, 1995, AOL came under fire for declaring the word breast
obscene, censoring user profiles and chat room titles devoted to breast
cancer survivors. This was not AOL's first encounter with this par-
ticular problem. Earlier in the year, breast cancer survivors who were
blocked from creating a forum with the word "breast" in the title in-
stead created a "hooter cancer survivor" forum.2 In an effort to
comply with the anticipated indecency standard of the CDA, the com-
pany sought to eliminate "vulgar" words such as breast from the
network. This is an illustration of decent, constitutionally protected
speech "chilled" by the mere anticipation of a vague indecency stan-
dard. The more uncertain the speaker (in this case AOL) is about
whether or not a particular issue will trigger official sanction and the
greater the anticipated sanction (in economic costs and legal penal-
ties), the more likely the speaker is to self-censor.
This paper concentrates on the effects content regulation on the
provision of broadcast news and information programming offered the
American public. The effects suggest that federal regulation of content
controls can sharply constrain the quality and quantity of public de-
bate. Further, strong parallels from previous experience with
regulating electronic speech can be extended to the CDA, offering
warning signals today.
II. CONTENT REGULATION IN BROADCASTING
The 1927 Radio Act created the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC), establishing federal control over the airwaves. The 1927 law,
22. It could be argued that the evidence proves only that such FCC broadcast content
rules as the Fairness Doctrine should be illegal. We would be quick to point out that the
ability of the courts to differentiate "chilling" content controls from innocuous ones is not
sufficiently present to warrant such a conclusion.
23. Richard Knox, Women go online to decry ban on 'breast,' BOSTON GLOBE, Decem-
ber 1, 1995, at 12.
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which was designed to be provisional, was renewed every year until
1934 when Congress passed the Communications Act, replacing the
FRC with the Federal Communications Commission. 24 Spectrum ac-
cess continues to be governed by the 1934 Act.25
The FCC was charged with licensing and overseeing broadcasters
according to "the public interest, convenience or necessity." In addi-
tion to developing a federal licensing system for broadcasters,2 the
FRC (later the FCC) determined that certain types of speech were re-
quired by the public interest standard, as the Commission enunciated
in its 1949 report, Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees.
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass
communication in a democracy is the development of an in-
formed public opinion through the public dissemination of
news and ideas concerning the vital issues of the day ... The
Commission has consequently recognized the necessity for li-
censees to devote a reasonable percentage of their broadcast
time to the presentation of news and programs devoted to the
consideration and discussion of public issues of interest in the
community served by the particular station. And we have rec-
ognized, with respect to such programs, the paramount right of
the public in a free society to be informed and to have pre-
sented to it for acceptance or rejection the different attitudes
and viewpoints concerning these vital and often controversial
issues which are held by the various groups which make up
the community.27
The FCC argued that in the absence of regulatory inducements,
the broadcaster would not provide sufficient informative and/or con-
troversial material. The agency's 1949 report formalized this policy in
the form of the Fairness Doctrine, which consisted of two require-
ments. First, licensees were required to provide coverage of "vitally
important controversial issues of interest in the community served by
the broadcaster." ' Second, licensees received a mandate to "provide a
24. For a detailed account of the establishment of federal control over broadcasters, see
Hazlett, supra note 18.
25. The 1996 Telecommunications Act left radio and TV station licensing virtually un-
touched.
26. AM radio was the only broadcasting service at the time of the 1934 Communica-
tions Act, with the FCC allocating spectrum for FM and television in subsequent years.
27. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. Rep. 1246, 1249 (1949).
28. The General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.
Rep. 2d 145, 146 (1985).
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reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints
on such issues."'29
The FCC had a two stage enforcement process for the Fairness
Doctrine. In the first stage the Commission would request that a licen-
see respond to a complaint filed with the Commission. This could
eventually lead to a hearing and a ruling by the Commission either in
favor of the plaintiff or the licensee. The penalties associated with a
Fairness Doctrine complaint ranged from the legal and research costs
of responding to the Commission's inquiry, to giving the plaintiff free
airtime."° The second stage of enforcement was the most potent
weapon the FCC had, the power to revoke a license or refuse renewal
for an uncooperative licensee.
Interestingly, the two prongs of the Fairness Doctrine yield dis-
tinct economic incentives for broadcasters. The first prong can be
characterized as an affirmative obligation on the part of broadcasters
to increase the amount of informational programming. However, the
Commission was careful to point out in most Fairness Doctrine pro-
ceedings that licensees had broad discretion over how they chose to
satisfy this aspect of the rule.3 The second prong, on the other hand,
had more dramatic effects on format choice. The equal access provi-
sion, while intended to ensure that audiences were exposed to more
than one viewpoint, had the perverse effect of penalizing broadcasters
for airing controversial programming by leaving them vulnerable to
litigation and demands for free air time to voice opposing opinions.
While we might consider that the first prong had a potentially
"warming" effect on the supply of controversial speech, the second
prong had tremendous potential to "chill" constitutionally protected
speech. In the following sections, we review some of the more notable
abuses of the Fairness Doctrine which suggest that the net effect of the
Fairness Doctrine on controversial speech was "chilling" rather than
"'warming."
29. Id.
30. The original directive that broadcasters provide "reasonable opportunity" for the
discussion of various viewpoints evolved into the equal access provision in the early 1960s.
Equal access required broadcasters to grant respondents free air time if no one was willing to
pay.
31. 13 F.C.C. Rep. 1246, 1251; Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C. Rep. 2d 1, 33 (1974); 102
F.C.C. 2d 145, 160.
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]II. CONTENT REGULATION PRE-"FAmNESs"
Efforts to use content regulation as a form of political control be-
gan with the advent of radio regulation. In 1928 the Federal Radio
Commission renewed the license for WEVD, owned by the Socialist
Party, but with the stern warning that the New York station must
"operate with due regard for the opinions of others."32 Regulators had
determined that programming which reflected the Socialist Party's
agenda was not in the public interest. The following year the FRC re-
fused an application by the Chicago Federation of Labor to increase
the power and hours of its station WCFL, because the station was run
"for the exclusive benefit of organized labor." The FRC ruled that
since only a limited number of stations could broadcast, "all stations
should cater to the general public and serve the public interest as
against group or class interest."33
A decade later, conservative broadcasters were pressured when the
FCC sought to protect President Roosevelt from pro-business com-
mentators. The regulatory target then was a regional network in New
England, the unabashedly right-wing Yankee Network, which con-
trolled three radio stations, and ran commentary from the likes of
Father Charles Coughlin, a controversial figure of the far right, who
was fond of referring to FDR as "Franklin Double-crossing Roose-
velt."' In 1939, the Mayflower Broadcasting Company submitted a
competing application to be granted a license to operate WAAB, one
of the Yankee Network's Boston stations." The license renewal chal-
lenge charged that Yankee broadcast political endorsements and
partisan coverage of controversial issues with no concern for fairness
or balance. Although the Mayflower application was thrown out for
misrepresentation, the FCC took the opportunity to review Yankee's
record in a formal hearing. The Commission's finding asserted that it
was protecting the public from the unbalanced coverage, noting that:
The record shows without contradiction that.., it was the policy
of Station WAAB to broadcast so-called editorials from time to
time urging the election of various candidates for political office
or supporting one side or another of various questions in public
controversy. Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy
32. 2 F.R.C. 156 (1928).
33. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. 36 (1929).
34. Powe, supra note 19, at 109.
35. One of the owners of Mayflower Broadcasting Company was a former employee of
the Yankee network who had previously complained to the FCC about WAAB's editorial
policy.
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only when devoted to the communication of information and the
exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented. Indeed, as one
licensed to operate in the public domain the licensee has assumed
the obligation of presenting all sides of important public ques-
tions, fairly, objectively and without bias. The public interest-
not the private-is paramount.36
Yankee managed to retain its license by promising no further edi-
torialization. This ruling gave birth to the Mayflower Doctrine, which
forbade broadcasters from editorializing, until the Commission re-
versed course and virtually imposed an obligation to editorialize in the
1949 report, Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees.37 During this time,
the Commission's decision shielded Roosevelt's New Deal from
broadcast criticism.
IV. RED LION: THE REST OF THE STORY
From the Supreme Court's perspective in 1969, the Red Lion case
began with a feisty octogenarian Reverend John Norris, owner of the
Red Lion Broadcasting Company, in Red Lion, Pennsylvania. On No-
vember 25, 1964, Norris' station WGCB broadcast a commentary by
the Reverend Billy James Hargis, an Oklahoma evangelist preacher.
Hargis' "Christian Crusade" was carried on many stations catering to
the religious right. During the 15-minute broadcast, Hargis unleashed
a scathing 2-minute attack on a liberal journalist, Fred Cook, in re-
sponse to Cook's recently published book, Goldwater: Extremist on
the Right. Cook subsequently wrote to several stations that had carried
Hargis' program requesting free airtime to respond under the personal
attack rules of the Fairness Doctrine.38 Rev. Norris refused to grant
Cook free airtime, though he did offer him access at the same rate
paid by Hargis ($7.50 for a quarter-hour). Cook subsequently filed a
Fairness Doctrine complaint with the FCC, which ruled that WGCB
was obligated to give Cook free airtime. By 1969 the case had found
its way to the Supreme Court.
In a landmark decision, the Court upheld the Commission's ruling,
ordering WGCB to give Cook free time to respond to the attack. In the
majority opinion, Justice Byron White concluded that, "the specific appli-
cation of the Fairness Doctrine in Red Lion... enhance[s] rather than
36. Mayflower Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C. 333, at 340 (1940).
37. 13 F.C.C. 1246.
38. The personal attack rules were an addition to the Fairness Doctrine introduced in the
1960s.
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abridge[s] the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First
Amendment."39 This conclusion of the Court appears to be uninformed of
the well-orchestrated campaign by the Democratic National Committee
(DNC) to silence pro-Goldwater forces prior to the 1964 presidential
elections which had brought this case before them.
In 1962, President Kennedy's policies were under sustained attack
from conservative broadcasters across the country. Of particular con-
cern to the President were vocal right-wing opponents of the nuclear
test-ban treaty being considered by the Senate at the time. The ad-
ministration and the DNC seized upon the Fairness Doctrine as a way
to counter the "radical right" in their battle to pass the treaty. The
Citizens Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was estab-
lished and funded by the Democrats, orchestrated a very effective
protest campaign against hostile radio editorials, demanding free reply
time under the Fairness Doctrine whenever a conservative broadcaster
denounced the treaty. Ultimately, the Senate ratified the treaty by a
resounding two-thirds majority. 40
Flush with this success, the DNC and the Kennedy-Johnson Ad-
ministration decided to extend use of the doctrine to other high-
priority legislation and the impending 1964 elections. Democratic
Party funding sources were used to establish a professional listening
post to monitor right-wing radio. The DNC also prepared a kit ex-
plaining "how to demand time under the Fairness Doctrine," which
was handed out at conferences.4' As Bill Ruder, an Assistant Secretary
of Commerce under President Kennedy, noted: "Our massive strategy
was to use the Fairness Doctrine to challenge and harass right-wing
broadcasters in the hope that the challenges would be so costly to
them that they would be inhibited and decide it was too expensive to
continue." 42
The Democrats' "fairness" campaign was considered a stunning
success by November 1964, when Johnson beat Goldwater in a land-
slide. The effort had produced 1,035 letters to stations, resulting in
1,678 hours of free airtime. 43 A critical factor in the campaign was that
much of the partisan commentary came from small, rural stations. In a
confidential report to the DNC, Martin Firestone, a Washington attor-
ney and former FCC staffer explained:
39. 395 U.S. 367, at 375.
40. FRED FRIENDLY, THE GOOD Guys, THE BAD Guys, AND THE FIRST A MENDMENT
(1975).
41. Id. at 35.




The right-wingers operate on a strictly cash basis and it for
this reason that they are carried by so many small stations.
Were our efforts to be continued on a year-round basis, we
would find that many of these stations would consider the
broadcasts of these programs bothersome and burdensome
(especially if they are ultimately required to give us free time)
and would start dropping the programs from their broadcast
schedule.4
Democratic Party operatives were part of the Red Lion Fairness
Doctrine challenge from the very genesis of Fred Cook's Goldwater.
Cook had been retained by the Democrats to write several
"controversial" pieces about the right including "Hate Clubs of the
Air," a critical profile of conservative broadcasters, which appeared in
The Nation. Wayne Phillips, a DNC staffer who had worked with
Cook, recalled:
Thousands of copies of Cook's article were sent to state
Democratic leaders and to every radio station in the country
known to carry right-wing broadcasts, together with a letter
from Sam Brightman of the DNC pointing out that claims for
time would be made in the event of attacks on Democratic
candidates or their programs.45
The DNC also funded Cook's book on Goldwater, preordering
50,000 copies to ensure publication. When Rev. Hargis attacked Cook
over the air it was the DNC, not Fred Cook, who was listening. Cook
was alerted to the broadcast and received considerable help from the
DNC in filing Fairness Doctrine complaints. The efforts paid off; the
majority of stations stopped carrying Hargis' commentary, thus pro-
viding the very "chilling effect" the Supreme Court had failed to find
evident in the case.46
V. NIXON'S "CHILL"
Soon after the 1968 elections, the Nixon administration adopted a
policy of responding to all media reports deemed unfair or inaccurate.
Staffers wrote weekly press analyses entitled "Little Lies," which detailed
unfavorable media coverage and assigned responsibility for an official
44. Id. at 42.
45. Id. at 38.
46. For the remainder of his career, the Fairness Doctrine made Hargis a potential li-
ability to all broadcasters. In fact, over a decade after the historic broadcast Hargis remarked
that "many stations are still afraid to run [my program]." (Id. at 76).
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response. However, by October, 1969, Nixon's Chief of Staff H.R.
Haldeman recognized that the countercriticism campaign was ineffec-
tive and they were rapidly falling behind. The administration needed a
more targeted approach-what White House aide Jeb Magruder
dubbed the "rifle" approach to the media. This strategy, the corner-
stone of which was the Fairness Doctrine, was twofold. First, in an
attempt to affect network programming, administration staffers used
threats of Fairness Doctrine challenges in direct meetings and phone
calls with top executives at CBS, NBC and ABC. Second, the Repub-
lican National Committee (RNC) initiated a private campaign of direct
pressure on broadcasters through Fairness Doctrine complaints and
license renewal challenges.
The first component of this campaign was initiated by White
House aide Charles Colson. With the approval of Haldeman and the
President himself, Colson visited the New York headquarters of the
three television networks in September 1970, and for the next two and
a half years Colson called CBS chairman William Paley or president
Frank Stanton about once a month, occasionally arranging meetings in
Washington or New York as well. He called ABC and NBC execu-
tives as well, albeit less frequently. In a July, 1971 White House
meeting between Stanton and Colson, "Colson chuckled that he could
never hope for constant fairness from CBS, but maybe they could
agree on an 'occasional fairness doctrine.' Stanton smiled apprecia-
tively and said he wanted Colson to feel free to pick up the phone any
time he felt he had reason to complain.' 47 Later in 1972, Colson
phoned Stanton to inform him that the administration was considering
a five-point plan of action against the networks which included a pro-
posal to license the networks themselves48 and a campaign to upset the
license renewal process for television stations.49
The strategy was to directly intimidate broadcast executives in the
hope that they would eventually tone down their unfavorable coverage
of the administration by their news units, and in mid-1973 the effort
finally paid off. Following a meeting at the White House between
47. DANIEL SCHORR, CLEARING THE AIR 48 (1977).
48. The FCC has licensed broadcast outlets-radio and television stations-but not the
national networks that supply programming. However, each of the networks owns several
TV stations in the largest markets; hence, the government does have some leverage over
programmers through station license renewal and transfers. Id.
49. Until 1981 radio and television licenses were issued for three year periods. When
the license expired, the licensee was required to-file a renewal application with the FCC. At
this point any third party could file a competing application for the license. Although renew-
als were, as a rule, granted, a competitive application would generally delay the renewal
procedure and substantially raise the cost of renewal to the licensee through additional re-
search and legal fees. Id.
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Paley and Haldeman, CBS announced plans to drop its policy of pre-
senting news analysis immediately following presidential statements.
Although it was widely believed that CBS had been "silenced, or in-
timidated, or subverted" by the administration,"o Paley denied this,
stating that his only objective was "better, fairer, more balanced" cov-
erage."
In a 1972 hearing before the Senate constitutional rights subcom-
mittee on freedom of the press, CBS correspondent Dan Schorr
summed up the effects of the Nixon administration's pressure on
broadcasters. "... I do not think that many reporters will be directly
intimidated. We generally cannot be deterred by Government, but
only by our employers. And it is our employers who feel the real pres-
sure-especially in the regulated broadcast industry, where networks
can be subjected to pressure in many ways...""
The first element of Magruder's "rifle" strategy was all the more
effective because of the second element, real rather than threatened
Fairness Doctrine challenges to broadcast licensees. In early January,
1970, White House staffers began organizing a campaign to monitor
the media and challenge the license renewals of "unfriendly" broad-
casters. The strategy, developed by Magruder, involved having FCC
chairman "Dean Burch 'express concern' about press objectivity," and
organizing "outside groups [to] petition the FCC and issue public
'statements of concern' over press objectivity."53 One early outcome
of this campaign was a Fairness Doctrine complaint against CBS
mounted by the Republican National Committee (RNC).
After five televised speeches by Nixon on Vietnam policy, CBS
offered airtime to the Democratic National Committee to respond.""
Following the first DNC broadcast, the RNC, arguing that the DNC
had addressed issues other than Vietnam, demanded time for rebuttal
under the Fairness Doctrine. The petition was refused by CBS and the
case went before the Commission, which ruled in favor of the RNC.
50. John Pastore, head of the Senate Communications Subcommittee. (Quoted in
SCHORR, supra note 47, at 62).
51. Roger Mudd wrote a balanced but critical commentary of the network's decision,
which was to be aired on CBS Radio the day after the announcement. It too was eliminated.
Only after a memo outlining the meeting between White House staffers and Paley was
leaked four and a half months later did CBS resume to the practice of instant analysis of
presidential speeches. (PowE, supra note 19, at 139).
52. ScHoRR, supra note 47, at 74.
53. Id. at 42.
54. During his first eighteen months in office Nixon made 14 televised speeches, as
many as the total for Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson combined over a comparable pe-
riod. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 454 F.2d 1018,
1020 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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The D.C. Circuit later overturned the FCC's ruling in a blistering
opinion, noting that "the [FCC] is functioning in the midst of a fierce
political battle, where the stakes are high and the outcome can affect
in a very real sense the political future of our nation.
' 5
The principal targets of license renewal challenges were the five
television stations owned and operated by CBS and the three televi-
sion stations owned by the Washington Post. While the
Administration, in private meetings with network executives, repeat-
edly threatened to make CBS's renewals more expensive, the Post felt
the most pressure, largely because of its aggressive Watergate report-
ing. Although the newspaper's publishing operations were relatively
immune to political retaliation, President Nixon recognized that their
broadcast properties-two television stations in Florida and one in
Washington, D.C-were vulnerable. Nixon remarked to Haldeman in
1972, "The main thing is the Post is going to have damnable, damna-
ble problems out of this one [Watergate coverage]. They have a
television station ... and they're going to have to get it renewed. 56
The Post's Florida stations survived three costly challenges during the
Nixon years, mounted by Administration allies.57
Thus, CBS, the Washington Post and other Nixon "media ene-
mies" felt pressure because the Executive branch was able'to
manipulate the federal broadcast licensing system, "punishing" those
whose coverage was deemed unfavorable through Fairness Doctrine
challenges and competitive applications at the time of license renewal.
VI. EXTENDING THE "CHILL" BEYOND WASHINGTON POLITCS
Exploitation of the Fairness Doctrine was not limited to presidents
or the major political parties. Many public interest groups used the
doctrine to influence the debate on local and regional issues as well as
commercial speech. For example, the 1985 FCC proceedings on the
Fairness Doctrine recount a battle that ensued over a California refer-
endum on a glass recycling program. The beverage industry prepared
an advertising campaign in opposition to the bottle bill. When the
bottle bill lobby learned of the advertisements, they wired 500 stations
demanding twice the amount of airtime free from any station accept-
55. 454 F.2d at 1027.
56. SCHOR, supra note 47, at 52.
57. The Post's Jacksonville station survived a license challenge in 1970 by the man who
became the finance chairman of Nixon's 1972 campaign in Florida. The Miami station sur-
vived challenges, in 1970 and 1972, by Nixon allies. PowE, supra note 19, at 131.
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ing the commercials. Two-thirds of the stations subsequently refused
the bottle industry's ads.58
The Fairness Doctrine went beyond public affairs, affecting com-
mercial speech as well. Anti-smoking activists filed a successful
fairness complaint against CBS in response to cigarette advertising"
and the environmental group Friends of the Earth waged a fairness
campaign against luxury automobile advertising. The Fairness Doc-
trine was invoked against advertisements for everything from
snowmobiles and trash compactors to Crest toothpaste.'
VII. THE FCC LIFrs RADIO REGULATION, 1979-87
By the 1970s, such egregious abuses of the system by both politi-
cians and special interest groups were eroding support for content
regulation of radio and television. In the final years of the Carter ad-
ministration, the FCC reversed its position on broadcast regulation by
arguing for more reliance on marketplace forces and less on content
controls.6 The Commission substantially reduced the burdens on
broadcasters with the "Deregulation of Radio" in 1981,62 which com-
prised the following:
NON-ENTERTAINMENT PROGRAM REGULATION. The FCC elimi-
nated "guidelines" indicating how much informational programming
each station should render to have its license renewed, replacing it
with "a generalized obligation for commercial radio stations to offer
programming responsive to public issues."
ASCERTAINMENT. Elimination of formal documentation of
"community needs."
COMMERCIALS. Abolition of FCC guidelines on maximum com-
mercial time allowed on radio stations.
58. General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143,
176 (1985).
59. Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968).
60. WELLIAm B. RAY, FCC: THE Ups AND DOWNS OF RADIO-TV REGULATION 100 (1990).
61. A leading force in this was President Carter's Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Telecommunications, Henry Geller. A former FCC General Counsel who had avidly pursued
content controls through licensing, Gelier came to the view that, "Behavioral regulation
sucks. The one thing that works is competition, and that's what I keep pushing for." Who Are
You Gonna Call? Here Are The Bell Ringers, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 1995, at A24.
62. In Matter of Deregulation of Radio, Deregulation of Radio: Report and Order, 84
F.C.C.2d 968 (1981).
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PROGRAM LOGS. Elimination of program logs, to be replaced by
"an annual listing of five to ten issues that the licensee covered to-
gether with examples of programming offered in response thereto."63
The non-entertainment guidelines required AM stations to offer
8% non-entertainment programming and FM stations to offer 6%. In
simple terms, informational programs (i.e., non-entertainment) were
considered to be news, talk, and public affairs, while entertainment
programming consisted of music. The ascertainment process required
stations to survey "community leaders" to determine issues of impor-
tance to their listeners, and then to document the stations' response to
these concerns. The commercial guidelines set an upper limit on
commercials: no more than 18 minutes per hour. The program logging
rule required stations to record all programs broadcast.
The 1981 deregulation was important because it represented a sea
change within the Commission. It now advocated a reliance on mar-
ketplace forces to achieve public interest goals, rejecting the viability
of regulation. In its 1981 Report and Order implementing the regula-
tory reforms the Commission stated:
We believe that, given conditions in the radio industry, it is time
to ... permit the discipline of the marketplace to play a more
prominent role ... Simply stated, the large number of stations in
operation, structural measures, and listenership demand for cer-
tain types of program (and for limitations on other types of
programming, to wit: commercials) provide an excellent envi-
ronment in which to move away from the content/conduct type of
regulation that may have been necessary for other times, but that
is no longer necessary in the context of radio broadcasting to as-
sure operation in the public interest."
The Commission recognized, as noted by Commissioner James
Quello, "the process of license renewal appears to be a very expen-
sive, time-consuming method of ferreting out those few licensees who
have failed to meet a subjective 'public interest' standard of perform-
ance." The principal objective of the 1981 deregulation was to
streamline this renewal process, with the conviction that, "the enor-
mous savings in time and money could be used for more constructive
purposes in programming and news."'
63. 84 F.C.C.2d at 971. The Commission lifted the same rules applying to television
station licenses in 1984.
64. Id. at 1014.
65. In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, 594 (1979).
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While the 1981 deregulation represented a substantial change in
broadcast policy, it left intact the most important form of content
control, the Fairness Doctrine.' Yet by 1984, the Commission had
begun an inquiry into the Fairness Doctrine, questioning its constitu-
tionality and effectiveness. In 1985 the FCC issued a report,
concluding, "[W]e no longer believe that the fairness doctrine, as a
matter of policy, serves the public interest."'67 The primary evidence
relied on was testimony from broadcasters, including this statement
from CBS reporter and anchorman Dan Rather:
When I was a young reporter, I worked briefly for wire serv-
ices, small radio stations, and newspapers, and I finally settled
into a job at a large radio station owned by the Houston
Chronicle. Almost immediately on starting work in that sta-
tion's newsroom, I became aware of a concern which I had
previously barely known existed-the FCC. The journalists at
the Chronicle did not worry about it; those at the radio station
did. Not only the station manager but the newspeople as well
were very much aware of this Government presence looking
over their shoulders. I can recall newsroom conversations
about what the FCC implications of broadcasting a particular
report would be. Once a newsperson has to stop and consider
what a Government agency will think of something he or she
wants to put on the air, an invaluable element of freedom has
been lost."
In an extension of the logic behind the 1981 deregulation, the
Commission concluded that, "the interest of the public in viewpoint
diversity is fully served by the multiplicity of voices in the market-
place today...,69 Furthermore, based on the "voluminous factual
record," the FCC concluded there was strong evidence that the fair-
ness doctrine "actually inhibits the presentation of controversial issues
of public importance...,o
The report concluded that although the first prong was an af-
firmative obligation to cover controversial issues, the licensees had
broad discretion in determining how to comply with the requirement.
However, the second prong which required broadcasters to provide
equal access for the presentation of opposing viewpoints, did have a
66. Judge David Bazelon argued in 1975 that the Fairness Doctrine was "the most overt
form of program regulation in which the FCC engages." Bazelon, supra note 19, at 219.
67. Fairness Doctrine, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, at 147.
68. Id. at 171.
69. Id. at 147.
70. Id.
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"chilling effect" on controversial speech. This was because any pro-
gramming on a controversial subject would expose the broadcaster to
potential Fairness Doctrine challenges or demands for free air time
under the equal access provisions. The Commission summarized the
net effect of the doctrine:
[T]he fairness doctrine in its operation encourages broadcast-
ers to air only the minimal amount of controversial issue
programming sufficient to comply with the first prong. By re-
stricting the amount and type of controversial programming
aired, a broadcaster minimizes the potentially substantial bur-
dens associated with the second prong of the doctrine while
remaining in compliance with the strict letter of its regulatory
obligations ... [I]n net effect the fairness doctrine often dis-
courages the presentation of controversial issue
programming.7
This analysis is all the more significant in that it comes from the
agency responsible for writing and enforcing broadcast regulation.
That the FCC should determine in 1981 and 1985 that content regula-
tion was counter-productive to achieving public interest goals would
suggest that the notion of effective content regulation had been thor-
oughly discredited.
VIII. DID THE FAIRNEss DOCTRINE "WARM" OR "CHILL"?
Despite the complaints leveled against content regulation, a criti-
cal litmus test is whether it achieves its objectives. In 1987 Senate
hearings for the ill-fated Fairness in Broadcasting Act, Senator Ernest
Hollings (D-SC) noted that there are two important considerations in
the regulation of broadcasters according to a public interest standard.
"First, the regulation must be effective. It should accomplish the pur-
pose for which it was designed. If not, it should be amended or
replaced. Second, the regulation should be narrowly tailored so as to
impose the minimal burden on the licensee. 72 The 1981 and 1987
events offer a unique window onto the effects of content regulation, as
71. Id. at 160. However, because of uncertainty over the Commission's authority to
abolish the Fairness Doctrine, the rule remained in effect until August 1987 when it was
finally eliminated. Congress later attempted to codify the fairness doctrine, which would
have effectively reimposed the FCC's own regulation. H.R. 1934 / S. 749, 100th Cong.,
(1987).




judged by the behavior of broadcasters before and after the changes. If
content controls did provide diversity in programming, and initiate
informative debate over controversial subjects, their merits might bal-
ance the potential for abuse. Did they? The post-deregulation radio
market offers a unique opportunity to answer that question with mar-
ketplace evidence.73
A. Programming Trends in Radio: 1975-1995
A great deal of controversy surrounded the 1981 and 1987 de-
regulations. Many argued that dropping content rules would
drastically reduce the overall supply of informational programming
and end balanced coverage of important public issues. 74 Yet, radio has
recently enjoyed a resurgence as both an influential medium for the
discussion of policy issues and a dynamic business sector.75 For exam-
ple, in a major 1993 poll about talk radio, the Times Mirror Center for
The People & The Press reported that one in six adults regularly lis-
tens to telephone talk shows about current events, issues and politics.
One in four adults had listened to a talk show the day Times Mirror
called or the day before, and another quarter said they sometimes lis-
ten.76
In examining the U.S. radio market over the past two decades,
there are three important "events" to consider. First, there is rapid
growth in the overall number of radio stations, the bulk of the growth
coming in the FM band. FM, which had been long suppressed by FCC
policy," finally came into its own in the 1960s (following the FCC's
authorization of stereo broadcasting on FM in 1961), and passed AM
in listening share in 1979.78 The increasing number of stations was a
function of two interactive forces: public policy (more licenses were
73. See also Thomas W. Hazlett and David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a
"Chilling Effect"? Evidence for the Post Deregulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
279 (1997).
74. The FCC received thousands of comments during its 1979-81 proceedings. For ex-
ample, the ACLU and the National Organization of Women argued that, "consumer
satisfaction is not the appropriate criterion for judging performance of radio markets. Rather
... public 'need' as distinguished from public 'want' should be the criterion .. ." (84 F.C.C.
2d 968, at 1015). Likewise, the 1987 elimination of the Fairness Doctrine sparked a mael-
strom of protest from groups as diverse as the ACLU, Mobil Oil and the NAACP, as well as
conservative commentator Pat Buchanan.
75. VINCENT M. DITINGO, THE REMAKING OF RADIO (1995).
76. Douglas Davidoff, Rock to talk: Indiana AM radio saved by the gift of gab, 37(10)
INDIANA BusiNEss 21 (1993).
77. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, A MAN OF HIGH FIDELITY: EDWARD HoWARD
ARmSTRONG, 257-292 (1956) (discussing the developmental setbacks suffered by FM sta-
tions in the period after World War I).
78. DITINGO, supra note 75, at 18, 60.
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supplied by the Commission) and market demand (more stations were
economically viable). The second "event" is the 1981 "Deregulation
of Radio," and the third is the FCC's abolition of the Fairness Doc-
trine in August 1987.
One of the advantages of studying radio markets is that stations
typically have a distinct format throughout the daily program sched-
ule, and these formats are reported by established industry sources.
Hence, published format data can reveal what changes are taking
place in radio programming over a given period.
To analyze the effects of content regulation on broadcasters' for-
mat choices, we obtained data on radio programming for both AM and
FM broadcasters nationwide over the period 1975-1995."9 These for-
mats are summarized for AM radio in Table 1.
79. BROADCASTING AND CABLE YEARBOOK (1995). The Yearbook publishes detailed in-
formation on broadcasters, including a list of stations by principal format. A principal format
(as defined by the Yearbook) is one that the station broadcasts for more than twenty hours
per week. Under this definition, it is possible for a station to have more than one principal
format. Our data series begins in 1975 because this was the first year the Yearbook compiled
comprehensive data on radio stations by format.
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There is a pronounced upward trend in the number of format cate-
gories reported over this period. Throughout the interval, music is the
dominant broad category." In 1975 the music category is dominated
by a few specific format types, such as country-western and adult
contemporary. By 1995 the music category consisted of over 15 spe-
cific formats, including for example, urban contemporary, new age,
and bluegrass.
We can aggregate the raw data into five broad format categories:
music, information, religious, foreign language/ethnic, and mixed.8
Consolidating the formats into five broad groups minimizes sampling
error associated with categorizing programming. Using such broad
categories over the entire period also protects against biasing a meas-
ure of diversity due to changes in format definitions.





1 9 Info E Religious * Foreign * Mixed
80. Music accounted for 90.8% of AM programming in 1975, falling to 51.7% in 1995.
In FM the share of music formats fell from 89.8% to 79.6% over the period. Id.
81. The "mixed" category consists of formats such as agriculture and drama/literature
that neither fit well into another category nor have any clear relationship between one an-
other.
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Figures 1 and 2 omit the music shares, which form the residual
category. While an upward trend is apparent in each of the non-music
categories over the entire 1975-1995 range, the increase is most notice-
able in informational programming. The share of informational formats
on FM increases from 4.64% in 1975 to 7.39% in 1995, but the more
dramatic increase is in the AM band where the share of informational
programming rises from 4.29% to 27.60%. Particularly impressive is
the 20.89 percentage point increase in AM informational share between
1987 and 1995.
Figures 3 and 4 show the breakdown of the informational category
into four sub-categories: news, news/talk, public affairs and talk.' In
AM radio, the news/talk sub-category drives the later increases in in-
formational programming. Conversely, a surge in news formats drives
the rise in the information category in the FM band.
82. News/talk was introduced as a format in 1990. It appears, logically enough, to have
drawn from both news and talk formats.
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FIGURE 4: FM INFORMATION FORMATS
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B. The FCC's Economic Model
In a 1979 Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking,83 the FCC
outlined a model of economic behavior in which competition among
broadcasters would transform radio into a specialty medium, increasing
the flow of diverse and controversial material and better serving the di-
verse American audience.' The FCC hypothesized that this competition
83. In Re Deregulation of Radio, 73 F.C.C.2d 457 (1979).
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would result from a sharp increase in the supply of radio licenses, espe-
cially those granted to FM stations under more liberal Commission
licensing policies. Indeed, between 1975 and 1995 the number of AM
stations increased by 11.1% and the number of FM stations increased by
102%.
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Enhanced radio competition forced stations to tailor their programs
to narrower audiences. This impact was already evident by the time of
the Deregulation of Radio proceeding. In fact the changes were a moti-
vating factor for the deregulation itself. As the Commission noted in
1979:
The growth of a viable FM presence has important policy im-
plications.... [I]f the new stations can and do capture
significant audience shares from existing stations, then the older
dominant stations must be responsive to the challenge of com-
petition. If successful, innovative stations with experimental
formats would place strong competitive pressures on existing
stations, and would affect market conduct and performance. 
5
Econometric analysis of the data suggests that the Commission was
correct in its observation that competition between broadcasters was an
effective means of delivering public interest outputs. 86 The 1981 de-
regulation had little effect on the broadcast supply of informational
programming. The elimination of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, how-
ever, coincided with a statistically significant change in the structure of
85. Id. at 485.
86. Hazlett and Sosa, supra note 76.
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the AM radio market.' More precisely, after 1987 we see a dramatic
increase in the amount of informational programming as the share of
news and talk formats rises steadily. Further quantitative analysis also
suggests that the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine allowed AM radio to
exploit its comparative advantage over FM by substituting talk formats
for music. 3
Fundamentally, the quantitative evidence strongly suggests that re-
peal of the Fairness Doctrine led to significant increases in
informational programming. This outcome is entirely consistent with
the FCC's 1985 determination that the doctrine constrained broadcasters
by making the presentation of controversial issues economically risky.
The marketplace evidence suggests that content controls stifled pro-
gramming on controversial issues, presumably by increasing the
likelihood that a given radio station would be both challenged for not
providing adequate access to alternative viewpoints, and forced to grant
free air time. Once the doctrine was repealed, broadcasters were free to
provide more informational programming, especially on controversial
issues, without the fear of Fairness Doctrine challenges. The data show
that, in fact, broadcasters provided much more informational program-
ming once the controls were lifted.
IX. CONTENT CONTROLS AND THE INTERNET
The parallels between the content controls imposed via the FCC li-
censing process and the CDA are substantial. Fundamentally, both seek
to sanction "bad" speech disseminated by a broadcaster or network pro-
vider. While the Fairness Doctrine sought to regulate biased news
coverage, the CDA attempts to control "indecent" expression. However,
just as it proved impossible for regulators, broadcasters and the public
to develop a working definition of what constituted "fair" or even
"local" media coverage, 9 it is equally improbable that a diverse society
can settle upon a clear definition of indecent speech.
In addition, the behavioral incentives of the CDA are similar to
those of the Fairness Doctrine. Both operate by imposing economic
87. We limited our quantitative analysis to AM radio because of changes in the way
formats were reporting for FM during the sample period.
88. AM will have a comparative advantage over FM for talk formats due to differences
in the cost of operations. AM delivers lower sound quality than FM, but this is more accept-
able for talk formats as opposed to musical high-fidelity formats.
89. In 1979 the Commission admitted that "[a]lthough the Fairness Doctrine requires
stations to provide coverage of controversial issues of interest to the community, we [FCC]
have never defined the term 'community' as it applies to fairness issues." 73 F.C.C.2d at
517.
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penalties on networks or program providers who violate vague legal
standards. As discussed in the preceding sections of this article, various
groups have used the Fairness Doctrine to impose sanctions on contro-
versial speech. In the case of the CDA also, controversial speech will be
a significant liability, not only to Internet service providers but also to
individuals posting content on the Internet. Whether the liability stan-
dard is "fairness" or "indecency," the end result will be a frigid "chill"
on constitutionally protected speech because the fear of litigation dis-
courages individuals from producing and disseminating speech that
potentially may be found "unfair" or "indecent."
Moreover, the just as the Fairness Doctrine exhibited the potential
for abuse by political and public interest groups, we can expect that
such groups will exploit the vague indecency standard of the CDA by
assaulting their adversaries and opponents with legal challenges. Addi-
tionally, the vague standard may be abused by the government. As Steve
Russell, a retired Texas state judge, noted in an article that was intended
to violate the CDA; "You [Congress] have... handed the government a
powerful new tool to harass its critics: a prosecution for indecent com-
mentary in any district in the country."" In a democracy, robust public
debate always involves some modicum of offense. The CDA-much
like the Fairness Doctrine before it-is an open invitation to respond to
an opposing viewpoint not with an argument but with an economic
sanctions.
Furthermore, content rules tend to silence small organizations and
individuals first, a characteristic also observed in the abuse of the Fair-
ness Doctrine. The drafters of the CDA went to considerable length to
provide complex legal defenses to CDA challenges. But, as the ACLU
noted in a December 4, 1995 letter to House conference committee par-
ticipants:
Although corporations with large legal departments may fare
better [under the CDA], the small independent content and ac-
cess providers will be effectively frozen out of the [more
complex] defenses, with a profound chilling effect on their own
speech for fear of offending the vague prohibitions dnd being
sent to prison. The same is true for the individual user who
communicates in chat rooms and on bulletins. Thus, [the CDA]
90. Steve Russell, The X-On Congress: Indecent Comment on an Indecent Subject, Feb-
ruary 8, 1996 (reprinted in HARPER'S MAGAZINE, May 1996, at 24). This profanity-filled
condemnation of the CDA was originally published in the American Reporter, an online
journal, on February 8, 1996 as a deliberate challenge to the CDA. To underscore arguments
that the electronic media is treated differently than print, two magazines reprinted the article
two months later, and found (obviously) no prosecution in the offing.
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... will harm the very people who have made cyberspace the
incredibly rich source of information it is today."
In this manner, content regulation deprives the audience of the very di-
versity of opinion that policymakers often seek to create.
The introduction of the CDA could put controversial discourse on
ice, reducing not only the breadth of speech but also the number of
speakers, well beyond Congressional intentions. Most Internet service
providers and other "speakers," large and small, would censor them-
selves in order to steer clear of potential CDA sanctions. This kind of
self-censorship is the most costly aspect of content regulation. For ex-
ample, during the recent court case involving the CDA, America Online,
Inc. ("AOL") announced that if the law were upheld, the company
would consider eliminating chat groups from its service. 2 These chat
"rooms" allow subscribers to engage in written "real time" conversa-
tion, and are one of the most popular features of AOL service.
The potential for such broad-reaching effects is hugely ironic in that
the arguments in favor of content regulation in the early days of broad-
casting are so completely overwhelmed by the expansiveness of the
Internet, which allows so many a voice where so few once spoke. Con-
tent regulation was justified on the premise that access to the airwaves
was physically limited.93 Yet the ability to speak across the Internet is
virtually unlimited-its crowning glory as a consumer service. The old
regulator's saw that every broadcast voice cannot be heard does not ap-
ply to the Internet. The Internet is a medium for both one-way point-to-
multipoint (broadcasting) and two-way point-to-point communications.
One homepage, newsgroup or bulletin board can reach millions of peo-
ple with one-way communications, and the message is much richer than
traditional broadcasting: text, sound, images, and full-motion video are
all possible. Once outfitted with a computer and a phone line, anyone
can find their way to the on-ramp and cruise the much vaunted informa-
tion superhighway. As Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and
Ron Wyden (D-WA) note in their proposed amendment to the telecom-
munications reform legislation, "the Internet and other interactive
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
91. Letter from Laura W. Murphy and Donald Haines of the ACLU to the House Con-
ference Committee on Telecommunications Deregulation (Dec. 4, 1995) (available at
<http:lwww.aclu.orglcongress/Cybrltr.html>, visited April 2, 1997).
92. Pamela Mendel, AOL May Abandon Chats if Decency Law Stands, N.Y. TIMES
CYBERTIMES, April 2, 1996 <http:lwww.nytimes.comlweb/docsrootllibrary/cyber/weekl
0402decency.html>.
93. This view has been thoroughly critiqued by economists and legal experts. See
Coase, supra note 17; Hazlett, supra note 18; J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in
Jericho, 81 CAL. L. Rav. 1209 (1993) (book review).
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discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity."94
In the case of the Internet, legislators have proposed content regula-
tion not'to address a scarcity of access to information, but its
abundance; on the Internet one person can communicate with any other.
As with most powerful new communications technologies, the political
reflex is to protect existing paradigms by attempting to rein in and con-
trol the new medium. It was just such a reflex, however, that the First
Amendment was crafted to control.
X. CONCLUSION
The marketplace evidence that the Fairness Doctrine visibly
"chilled" broadcast speech is a crucial lesson to learn. In making its case
for the CDA, the DoJ has argued that the public interest in controlling
access by minors to indecent material outweighs the speculative harm to
free speech. Yet we have seen repeatedly that content regulation lends
itself to abuse by political interest groups and imposes sharp disincen-
tives on those who would air controversial opinions.
The first phase of the judicial review process for the CDA con-
cluded on June 11, 1996 when the special three-judge panel in
Philadelphia issued its ruling.95 In a "unanimous"9 6 decision in which the
judges held the CDA unconstitutional, the judges applied the concept of
differential treatment for different communications media.97 Thus, Judge
Stewart Dalzell labored to place the medium of the Internet somewhere
in a continuum between print and television, and Judge Dolores Sloviter
concluded that, ".... Internet communication, while unique, is more akin
to telephone communication ... than to broadcasting ... because, as
with the telephone, an Internet user must act affirmatively and deliber-
ately to retrieve specific information online." '
The origins of the theory of media difference can be traced back to
the establishment of federal control over broadcasting with the 1927
Radio Act and 1934 Communication Act. These laws advanced the no-
tion of differential treatment (namely, lessened free press protections)
for broadcasting due to its use of spectrum. This rationale, which blos-
94. The Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a) (1996)).
95. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
96. Id. Although the outcome was unanimous, each judge wrote a separate opinion in
the case.
97. Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 81 (1996) (original version at44 Stat. 1162).
98. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 (1996).
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somed as the "physical scarcity" (of spectrum) doctrine in the 1943
NBC case,' was used consistently by the Judicial branch for several
decades, even as evidence mounted against it.'00 The differential treat-
ment approach to media was revived by the Supreme Court's 1978
decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.' In Pacifica the Court upheld
the FCC's authority to regulate indecent programming in radio and tele-
vision on the grounds that broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive."'" The
approach has also been applied in subsequent cases involving cable
television and dial-a-pom.'03 The following passage from the panel's
CDA decision highlights the intention of the courts to create ad hoc
theories for each type of speech protected under the First Amendment:
All parties agree that in order to apprehend the legal questions at
issue in these cases, it is necessary to have a clear understanding
of the exponentially growing, worldwide medium that is the In-
ternet, which presents unique issues relating to the application of
First Amendment jurisprudence and due process requirements to
this new and evolving method of communication."
While defenders of free speech on the Internet may well wish to use
the differential treatment framework, and may even be successful in
arguing a "special case" for unregulated communications (as in the vic-
tory with the 3-judge panel), such a strategy can be very risky. The First
Amendment, rather than offering blanket protection to free speech and a
free press, must be petitioned on an individual basis. The scope for po-
litical compromise, and regulatory mischief, is apparent from the history
of radio broadcasting.
The Justice Department has announced that the government will ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, and the case will be decided in 1997. It is
unclear what awaits the CDA. The highest court has recently shown it-
self to be confused and divided over the issue of First Amendment
protections for electronic speech. In a case involving the Helms
Amendment to the 1992 Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, the Court issued a contradictory ruling, permitting
federal content regulation in some cases but not in others. 5
99. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
100. See, e.g., Coase, supra note 17.
101. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
102. Id. at 748.
103. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, (1994) (cable televi-
sion), and Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)
(telephone communications).
104. 929 F. Supp. at 844.
105. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
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In its defense of the CDA, the Justice Department argued that the
Internet should be treated like a broadcast medium for the purpose of
content regulation, in part because "the Internet is becoming more like
an entertainment medium."' ' Given the government's concession of
failure in regulating broadcast content-and the ugly episodes of politi-
cal abuse along the way-that assertion should send a chill through all
of us.
106. Print or Broadcast Model?; Judges Pressure Justice Department on Telecom Act
Decency, Comm. DAmLy, May 13, 1996, at 1.
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